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Gary Horvitz

Jun 1, 2014
02:20

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Chris, having reviewed the summary of your proposal, there are a few statements/assumptions that move me to comment. First, it is not so much the fossil fuel industry that is the obstacle to a carbon pricing plan. Well, OK, the API is a big obstacle. But it is mainly congress. See the comment on our thread prior to yours. Exxon and Shell (and likely others) are already behind the idea of carbon pricing and saying so publicly. Second, taxing the carbon they bring to market will not sap them of capital. Not only are these the most profitable companies in the world, they will simply pass on the cost to consumers. If you are suggesting that an in-house tax will not be passed on to consumers, how would you suggest they be prevented from doing so? Exxon already taxes itself in-house to reduce its own carbon footprint--at a rate of $60/ton. You also suggest that all of the revenue from the tax be recycled to transition fossil fuel companies to become low carbon energy suppliers. If they don't pass the costs on to consumers and consumers receive no dividend, then consumers are not involved in steering the economy toward low-carbon. As you can see from our proposal, we are looking for a vehicle that educates and involves the public. If a carbon pricing solution does not do that, can it be regarded as a market solution? If there is no public involvement in the real world economic decisions about carbon use, no incentives to change their purchasing habits, will they push congress to do anything? And if there is no push from below, what would move congress? Further, I think we are also looking for incentives for the broader manufacturing sector to lower their own carbon footprints as well. If, under your scenario, fossil fuel companies do pass the costs on to their customers and get to keep all the money from the self-imposed tax, then the public would, in effect, be subsidizing the fossil fuel companies to become low carbon energy suppliers. By creating such an anti-competitive market for low carbon energy, along with the subsidies they have so long enjoyed, the fossil fuel companies would be perpetuating their market advantage over the renewable sector.

Chris Taylor

Jun 1, 2014
07:32

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Gary, thanks for the feedback. I’ll deal with your points one at a time. “it is not so much the fossil fuel industry that is the obstacle” The fossil fuel industry has a huge influence over government. If you are a huge multi-national, it is your responsibility to shareholders to make sure you have interns and lobbyists working in the corridors of government to keep things running smoothly. But you are right about congress, they are an obstacle too. But you have to ask why? The answer is "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness". A tax (or fee) goes against that principle. “taxing the carbon they bring to market will not sap them of capital.” If you were selling fruit, and had to pay a higher tax for doing so, you wouldn’t be too happy, because you know you wouldn’t be able to pass on all the costs, and keep market share against other foodstuffs. A carbon tax is designed to make fossil fuels less competitive, that’s the whole idea. “Exxon and Shell are already behind the idea of carbon pricing” Fossil fuel companies might publicly be behind the idea of a price on carbon, but only on their terms and that could mean anything, like special allowances for big emitters. Don’t laugh, it happens in Germany. “If you are suggesting that an in-house tax will not be passed on to consumers, how would you suggest they be prevented from doing so?” That is the attraction with RNCFD, the dividend buffers any costs passed on. An Internalised Price on Carbon doesn’t do that, but it does directly subsidise low carbon energy, so that the overall price rise of energy during the transition would be 1.5%p.a. (About the same for RNCFD too). Don’t get me wrong, I would prefer RNCFD, but congress aren’t going to accept it any time soon, and the public have other things on their minds. An Internalised Price on Carbon clearly gives the fossil fuel companies a chance to dominate the low carbon energy market. The Republicans will be happy, because the old fossil fuel companies will have kept market lead after diversifying, and the Democrats will be happy with the reductions in emissions. “As you can see from our proposal, we are looking for a vehicle that educates and involves the public. If a carbon pricing solution does not do that, can it be regarded as a market solution?” A market solution means the government not picking winners. The Republicans are not against low carbon energy, they just want it to stand on its own two feet, without subsidies, and without a tax on carbon, putting fossil fuels at a disadvantage. “If there is no public involvement in the real world economic decisions about carbon use, no incentives to change their purchasing habits, will they push congress to do anything?” The public will never be informed enough about the intricacies of different types of carbon pricing to be able to push congress to accept one type of carbon price over another. Anyway, democracy only works if people think they can make a difference, which they don’t. “Further, I think we are also looking for incentives for the broader manufacturing sector to lower their own carbon footprints as well.” Both an Internalised Price on Carbon and RNCFD increase the price of fossil fuels, but a big advantage an Internalised Price on Carbon has is that it directly reduces the price of low carbon energy, something which RNCFD doesn’t do. Your last paragraph is spot on. One of the biggest reasons fossil fuel companies are slow to take up renewables is because renewable energy is diffuse, and presently less profitable. There had better be some incentive for fossil fuel companies to diversify. I don’t care at this late stage who gets market lead. I’ll just be happy for the USA to get on a pathway to low carbon emissions. The planet is way more important than any market advantage. Don’t get me wrong Gary. I’m an advocate for RNCFD, but I understand why the Republicans and fossil fuel companies will fight a perk free RNCFD. It’s much more likely they would accept an Internalised Price on Carbon, and that’s what this competition is all about, putting a proposal to congress which they are most likely to accept. In fact, the harder we push for RNCFD, the more likely they’ll accept an Internalised Price on Carbon. Won’t you be happy to see emissions cut, or do you have another agenda?

Mark Capron

Jun 4, 2014
12:47

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christaylor - Nice free market approach. "Internalized" is less complex than my "Opportunity". You might adjust the title and first few paragraphs to be more immediately clear to fossil fuel executives and congressional staffers. Maybe the Pitch: Fossil fuel companies set aside income to invest in renewable energy and storing CO2.

Chris Taylor

Jun 5, 2014
12:20

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Hi Mark, Thanks for your compliment. It means a lot considering you were last years winner. Your advice about adjusting the pitch is great. It is precisely because George Shultz, Phil Sharp and Bob Inglis are advisors that I entered this competition and it is of utmost importance to me that they peruse my proposal. I notice that you are a bit of a serial proposer! I'm going to take a bit of time out to study your proposals. Other than winning last years competition, did you get any more help in developing your ideas. Did MIT or Climate CoLab put teams together to further study and develop your proposal? How have your proposals progressed since last year? The reason I'm asking is because I have a proposal which I am considering to put forward to Climate CoLab which would seriously reduce ocean vessels' carbon emissions. This is all the more important because at the moment the shipping industry has no idea how to deal with this problem. I spent 25 years as a marine navigating officer, so I really know what I'm talking about. The problem is that I am just starting to make the right contacts in Europe to commercially develop the idea, which could mean EU funding. However, if Climate CoLab or MIT threw their collective intelligence and business acumen behind your ideas, and you have nothing but praise for their efforts, I'd be tempted let MIT develop my idea. There is some really serious mathematical analysis required at the research phase, way beyond my capabilities, so I really do need help. I hope we'll be able to have a frank discussion on this platform about your experience with Climate CoLab. Chris.

Gary Horvitz

Jun 5, 2014
02:34

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Chris, this is a response to your comment above: The job of lobbyists is not to "keep things running smoothly." It is to tilt the legislative, taxation and regulatory playing field in their direction. The fossil fuel industry has been enormously successful in that respect, using their wealth to avoid taxes, externalize their costs, retain subsidies, obfuscate public understanding of global warming, obstruct climate legislation and delay or kill regulation. You may be correct that the public has other things in mind than pushing for a carbon pricing measure. But what suggests to you that the public would accept a measure that rewards the one industry, rewards the bad behavior of that one industry, by allegedly forcing them to transition to a low carbon business model-- at public expense? That looks like just another form of corporate welfare that the public is getting right fed up with and which has brought us to this brink of time. Likewise, Rex Tillerson himself just told XOM shareholders he doesn't think there will be any stranded assets. So what makes you think the carbon energy sector would even be interested in forced transition? They might well use their K Street army to fight it. I say let them compete on a fair playing field like all the other energy companies, carbon and renewable alike. No favorites. No subsidies. No free externalities. If I have an agenda beyond reducing emissions, it's NO MORE BUSINESS AS USUAL.

Chris Taylor

Jun 5, 2014
10:51

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Hi Gary, Thanks for your response. It's always good to hear how others view the climate crisis, and you gave me some real insights into the political deadlock in the U.S. Congress. So much so, that I've completely rewritten the introductory summary. Chris.

Felipe De Leon

Jun 17, 2014
08:17

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Hi Chris, I would suggest you look into what is known as “windfall profits” that some companies earned in the European Trading Scheme. Although the mechanism there is different, there are strong parallels that could be drawn from the way some companies in the ETS received free carbon allowances, passed on the “cost” of these allowances to their users and the point ghorvitz in his first comment (Para 2 & 3). This paper: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2376177 looks into how windfall profits occurred before, what was done to address them and how they might resurface in a different form.

Chris Taylor

Jun 17, 2014
09:33

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Hi Felipe, Thanks for you feedback. I'm not sure how windfall profits would affect my proposal. Despite the price on carbon there are no allowances. As for passing costs on, because the carbon revenue raised is ploughed back into the companies, there is no overall direct cost increase to the energy mix due to the price on carbon. The increase in costs for fossil fuels equals the decrease in costs to low carbon energy because of the internal subsidies paid to low carbon energy generation.

Felipe De Leon

Jun 17, 2014
09:33

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Hi Chris, I understand that there are no allowances in your system, but there is a "cost" that companies could (and, in some cases might even be compelled to) pass on to their consumers. That "cost" however, is also going to come back to the company so that it can invest in renewables. That seems very similar to the windfall profits companies in the ETS got, despite the fact that, as I mentioned before, the mechanism is different. It seems to me that you are assuming that a dollar invested in any energy source will output the same amount of energy, so that changing the energy mix can simply be achieved by shifting money from one energy source to the other so that "the increase in costs for fossil fuels equals the decrease in costs to low carbon energy". Am I understanding that correctly? One more aspect you might want to expand on: how would you promote adoption and enforce compliance?

Chris Taylor

Jun 17, 2014
10:43

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Hi Felipe, There is a cost, and that is because of the inevitable increase in price per unit energy of low carbon generation compared to fossil fuel energy generation. This price will be passed on to the consumer, although, in the early stages, will be buffered by the 'internal subsidy'. The internal subsidy is there to allow low carbon generation get a foot-hold in the market, the foot-hold becoming more apparent with the gradual increase in the price on carbon. I am unaware of any pricing mechanism which will negate the extra cost of low carbon energy generation. This leads nicely onto your second point. I am not assuming that a dollar invested in any energy source will output the same amount of energy. I have specifically used system levelised costs to predict the increase in energy costs per unit of energy. I'm aware that their are other factors to take into account, such as market forces and new grid infrastructure. God forbid if nuclear had to pay the full costs of underwriting itself (which I think it should). Thanks for your advice about expanding on promotion and compliance. I'll look into that more deeply. What I've tried to do is come up with a system which fossil fuel companies might find attractive. That was the thinking behind letting the fossil fuel companies re-invest the price on carbon. Legislation will still be required so that all fossil fuel companies will have to comply, and to enforce an emissions reduction standard, companies which fail to comply will lose their carbon revenue. Quote "To get the fossil fuel companies to abide to a CO2 emissions reduction standard of about 2% per year (0.17% per month), a penalty should be introduced. A fossil fuel company which fails to meet the monthly target would forfeit it’s carbon revenue raised for that month. This revenue would instead be distributed to all the other energy companies in the scheme on a per unit of energy generated basis. Notice that no revenue leaves the energy sector. Because this penalty carbon revenue will be raised in proportion to the amount of carbon passing through the offending company, but will be distributed on a per unit of energy generated basis, the overall direction of revenue flow will be towards subsidising low carbon energy at the expense of fossil fuels. Even though energy companies will be opening themselves up to the risk of being penalised for failing to meet their monthly CO2 emissions reduction target, the risks will be outweighed through the possibility of receiving revenue from other companies which fail to cut their CO2e emissions."

Chris Taylor

Jun 18, 2014
02:21

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Hi Felipe, Just to continue where I left off, the nice thing about the above penalty is that even if an energy company doesn't meet it's monthly CO2 emissions reduction standard, just through the distribution of the penalty revenue, carbon emissions will be cut. It's a real win win situation. Staying on the topic of enforcement and compliance, I am also expecting a certain amount of self policing as I mention in this paragraph: "Once the scheme is started, it'll be in the fossil fuel companies interest to ensure it doesn't fail. A failure in carbon price would delay low carbon energy becoming cost competitive with fossil fuels, making any investment into low carbon technology by the fossil fuel industry worthless. Because the financial fallout would be catastrophic the fossil fuel industry would also want to audit each other's books, to insure against widespread cheating which could bring the system down." This type of self enforcement is important because government auditors don't understand the energy industry as well as the energy industry itself.

Ross Collins

Jun 27, 2014
04:09

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@christaylor - Glad you've got a solid discussion going already on your proposal. I like your approach but have a couple questions concerning implementation/feasibility: 1. How can you ensure that companies will "split up into departments depending on the sources of energy". Any requirement of major organizational overhaul seems like it could be a serious administrative barrier to your proposal. Is there a mechanism in your proposal that may incentivize the companies to do this anyway? 2. How can you ensure that the companies will use the carbon revenues toward clean energy projects in their portfolio? If there's anything large companies are good at, it's finding loopholes in tax or administrative law in order to shift money around as they see fit. What sort of additional enforcement or legal mechanisms might be required in your proposal to prevent this? Looking forward to your response.

Chris Taylor

Jun 28, 2014
10:53

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Hi Ross, Thanks for your interest. I don’t know much about departmental management in large energy companies, but I would imagine they would already be departmentalised. This is how BP UK has organised it’s divisions: http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/bp-worldwide/bp-united-kingdom/contact-bp-in-the-uk.html and Shell Global: http://www.shell.com/global/products-services/solutions-for-businesses.html In the EU, departmentalising became popular to improve efficiency in the 90’s. Each department now invoices it’s services to other departments within the company. Because no department wants to go over-budget, they are careful with paying for resources from other departments. This means that a department within a company cannot expand without there being an increase in demand for that department. I would imagine that energy companies would naturally want to use the same strategy for its different divisions of energy sources. As the price on carbon kicks in, the carbon intensive divisions would become less in demand and be able to raise less invoices for their services. To cut costs, those divisions would have to contract. Overall, each division would be operating at it’s maximum efficiency, ensuring that the whole company was operating at maximum efficiency. It’ll be the fossil fuel departments which will be raising the revenue from the price on carbon. This will be a cost to them, and encourage those departments to cut the amount of carbon in their fuels. However, it’ll be the low carbon energy generation departments who will be demanding their right to this revenue, and because all the departments are in the same company, they will know how much revenue they are due. Further, there is an Emissions Reduction Standard, (See Emissions Reduction Standard) enforced by the government of 0.17% per month. If this standard is breached by a company, that company will forfeit its carbon revenue to all the other companies in the scheme. This will force the carbon revenue raised to be spent on low carbon generation. Without enough investment in low carbon generation, a company will soon start to breach the Emissions Reduction Standard. Under such a scheme, it will be the energy companies who will be demanding enforcement. Such a huge investment into low carbon technology and generation will only see profitable returns if low carbon energy becomes cheaper and fossil fuel energy becomes more expensive. Without low carbon energy becoming competitive, there will be no market for it, and billions, if not trillions, of investment capital into the low carbon sector will have been wasted. The financial fallout will make 2008 look like a picnic. This is why fossil fuel companies will insist on legislation demanding that they can audit each others accounts. I hope this answers your questions.

Eric Dargy

Jul 11, 2014
03:16

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Not fully understandable, the author at least cares and has really thought about the problem.

Delton Chen

Jul 14, 2014
12:46

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Hello Chris, just letting you know that I linked your proposal into ours, from the point of view of just assessing the Internalised Price that you invented. Global 4C provides globalised rewards, and so there is a need to assess the differences between the two and benefits. Under how do these sub-proposals fit together. Best Regards Delton https://www.climatecolab.org/web/guest/plans/-/plans/contestId/1300701/planId/1307204

Chris Taylor

Jul 16, 2014
11:06

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Hi Delton, See my comment on your page. (Comment no.6) Chris

Delton Chen

Jul 17, 2014
12:59

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Hello Chris After reading you proposal again, some of my questions are answered. I wrote some alternative views on IPC. Something to ponder... 1) The -2% emissions reductions standard (ERS) is a regulation for the supply side of energy. The rising carbon tax is not a tax, but is a fee. The 'fee' that is imposed is 'returned' but only for another type of energy production. I am not sure if it is then a subsidy, because it is the fee given back but conditional that the company to diversify into another business model. (see point 2). Maybe it is a actually a 'bond'. A bond for good behaviour upon condition of meeting regulations and producing more energy. 2) Government is putting conditions on companies to produce specific goods & services? This is fundamentally important because the U.S. is very pro capitalism and anti socialism. If the govt starts telling companies what they have to produce and how much (goods and services) that's quite significant. Perhaps I am wrong, maybe the Govt does that often (refer 4) 3) I am unsure about the -2% ERS exact definition. You refer to both fossil fuel companies and energy companies. Lets say for example, an oil and gas company only sells liquid and gas fuel. How do they reduce emissions by 2% ? Is it the carbon content? 4) Based on the oil and gas example, if the government tells the oil & gas company to start making solar, wind, nuclear etc, then it is directly controlling the marketplace. One problem is that the oil & gas company may not have the skills and resources to build a solar power plant. They might just buy one. But then they're buying another company to offset their shrinking oil and gas business. Why buy a solar power plant? Maybe they could buy a software company instead? So the the IPC is Government interventionism. 5) I think your proposal still has merit, because it forces certain companies to start making cleaner power. My feeling (and I stand corrected) is that this proposal actually transcends capitalism and is morphed into state control. Perhaps this is what is needed. 6) I like the fact that the fee/tax is delivered back to invest in cleaner power. The fee & dividend sends the revenue to the public for their personal use. My gut feeling is that the IPC has some good ideas, and maybe the power companies would love it. Maybe if you just impose the -2% ERS that is all we need. But when I look at the latest reports - quote: "For the U.S. to do its share in reaching the 2°C target, by 2050 this per capita emissions level will need to decrease by an order of magnitude. " -- DDPP (2014). And so this means about 6% ERS. I am not sure if Congress would like it ?!? So there may be a need to introduce carbon taxes or F&D to reduce the demand side as well. Carbon tax, F&D, regulations (IPC) etc and a reward system (e.g. Global 4C would offset the costs for everybody by diluting the global money supply) are options. Of these only Global 4C is globalised. The big question is actually political, as you might agree. Delton

Delton Chen

Jul 17, 2014
11:49

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It appears that the ERS is essentially a CAP. It behaves like a CAP by limiting emissions with an annual reduction %. The recycled tax appears as a CONTRACT. It has the characteristics of a legal BOND requiring the company to undertake work to receive the BOND back. "BOND" as in contract and not as in financial bond. In this case, the BOND is a FORCED CONTRACT, because not all companies would be in agreement. Forced contracts are way outside my field of knowledge, but it may be important. http://www.forbes.com/sites/jimpowell/2012/03/29/outrageous-forced-contracts-could-become-legal-if-obamacare-mandate-is-upheld/ I am wondering if the IPC is actually a CAP-and-CONTRACT ? I am tempted to call it CAP-AND-BOND, but that could be confused with Green Bonds. Cheers Delton

Chris Taylor

Jul 18, 2014
06:22

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Hi Delton, Thank you for your observations. Your arguments are all very valid and my proposal is far from perfect. What an IPC tries to do is give some leeway to the fossil fuel companies. Your rewards program is one of the few proposals put forward which doesn’t directly penalise the fossil fuel companies with a tax. IPC is attempting to do the same. The fossil fuel companies understand that there is a risk that they’ll have to pay a tax on carbon, so an IPC is an opportunity for the fossil fuel companies to avoid such tax revenues leaving their coffers. But it does more than this, the returned revenue acts as a subsidy for diversifying into low carbon generation, a subsidy which will not be available to other green competition, giving the fossil fuel company a clear advantage. I agree with you that congress would not accept a 6% ERS, which is why I’ve limited it to 2%. At around 2040, when low carbon generation becomes cheaper than fossil fuel generation, the market will then become the driver of emissions reduction. The IPC is still required before then, to make the price of low carbon generation competitive. Finally, an IPC demonstrates that the future is still bright for the fossil fuel industry, they’ll just need to relabel themselves as Big Clean Energy. Chris

Climate Colab

Aug 5, 2014
08:21

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1. While this proposal recognizes importance of fossil industry interests and transition, it goes too far and ignores consumer impacts, as if it is not consumers who will pay increased fees or taxes. Discussing consumer impacts is important if this proposal is to advance into the final round. In terms of workability, each energy company is different and structured differently. Assumption that every fossil company would like to diversify into low carbon fuels is dubious. This assumption therefore needs to be justified from the literature, media, or other sources. 2. This is intriguing, but ultimately an underdeveloped idea. A serious concern is that this would devolve into windfall profits for companies as they pass on the carbon tax to consumers, but then capture the profits. What regulatory/enforcement mechanism will ensure that these companies don't capture windfall profits? Need to expand more details on this issue. 3. I like this proposal; well-researched, thorough and pragmatic (i.e. focus on the fossil fuel companies primarily over the public). Major outstanding question surrounds enforcing a fossil fuel company's investment in renewable/alternative energy sources. In other words, how will the government/regulator ensure that these companies are investing carbon revenue in alternative energy R&D? More generally, who will monitor/punish firm activity, a new organization or an existing one? More details here will be important for advancing to final round.

Chris Taylor

Aug 9, 2014
07:03

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Hi Climate CoLab judges/staff. Thank you for selecting my proposal. It’s important to me, because I really think I bring a novel perspective which doesn’t rely on an apathetic public creating the political will required. I will now go about answering your concerns, and then, where space allows, incorporate these answers into my proposal. ---------- "While this proposal recognizes importance of fossil industry interests and transition, it goes too far and ignores consumer impacts, as if it is not consumers who will pay increased fees or taxes. Discussing consumer impacts is important if this proposal is to advance into the final round." The impacts to consumers under an IPC would be much smaller than those under what the EPA and US Department of Energy is attempting to do presently. The subsidies, both direct and through government loan guarantees, offered to low carbon ventures is paid for by taxpayers and not the fossil fuel companies. Under an IPC, the fossil fuel companies subsidise the low carbon energy. To make matters worse for taxpayers, low carbon ventures will become dependant on government subsidies. If the subsidies are removed, consumers will go back to buying fossil fuels. Under an IPC the carbon revenue reduces the price of low carbon energy, making it competitive with fossil fuels, allowing the market to take over with no extra costs in taxes. An IPC is the only carbon price system which reduces the price of low carbon energy, making it twice as effective. Further, through the EPA demanding reductions in CO2 emissions, fossil fuel companies get hit with extra costs, which get passed onto the consumers. Without an IPC to bring down the price of low carbon energy, consumers are left with no alternative. ---------- "Assumption that every fossil company would like to diversify into low carbon fuels is dubious. This assumption therefore needs to be justified from the literature, media, or other sources." A fossil fuel company given the choice between paying the revenue raised through a price on carbon to the government, taxpayer or citizens, compared with investing it in its own low carbon energy ventures, would definitely choose the latter. However, to be fair, under an IPC, I would have nothing against a system giving the fossil fuel companies a choice. ---------- "A serious concern is that this would devolve into windfall profits for companies as they pass on the carbon tax to consumers, but then capture the profits. What regulatory/enforcement mechanism will ensure that these companies don't capture windfall profits?" The enforcement would be the regulatory 2% Emissions Reduction Standard per year (ERS). Initially, the carbon revenue raised would be small, and the cost of adhering to the 2% ERS would be greater than this. However, once the low carbon energy becomes cost competitive, the margin made through its sale would be limited by competitive pressure between energy companies. At this stage, the fossil fuel departments would have great difficulty passing on the carbon revenue costs because of the competition from low carbon energy. ---------- "How will the government/regulator ensure that these companies are investing carbon revenue in alternative energy R&D?" Initially, the 2% Emissions Reduction Standard per year (ERS) would ensure that more and more energy would have to be produced from low carbon generation. Secondly, because each ring fenced energy department would be responsible for maximising its own profit, low carbon generation departments would ensure that they receive all the carbon revenue that they are due. ---------- "Who will monitor/punish firm activity, a new organization or an existing one?" The fossil fuel companies will be tasked with setting up a committee to enforce self regulation. The whole operation will be audited by the US Department of Energy. Administration costs would be paid for from the carbon revenues. A company not adhering to the Emissions Reduction Standard or other regulation would forfeit one months carbon revenue, which would be paid to the other companies in the IPC scheme on a per energy unit basis. This will ensure prudent self regulation. After a while, the sheer amount of investment in low carbon hardware will ensure that the energy companies will not want the IPC scheme to fail.

Noël Bakhtian

Aug 12, 2014
06:28

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Hi christaylor, Thanks for your responses. We look forward to seeing them incorporated into your proposal. ~Noel (Co-Lab Fellow)

Climate Colab

Sep 3, 2014
12:21

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Overall, This is an elaborate version of revenue recycling; very complicated requirement for implementation via DOE. DOE would have to assess if they're making the right investments to qualify, something that would be very difficult to figure out. Also difficult to ensure equitability. Seems like the proposal would lead to all kinds of mergers and incentives we can't appreciate in terms of how people organize their business and reap benefits. The political feasibility would likely suffer as a result.
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